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Abstract
I study labor markets in which firms can hire via job referrals. Despite full equality in
the initial time period (e.g., equal ability, employment, wages, and network structure),
unequal wages and employment still emerge over time between majority and minority
workers, due to homophily—the well-documented tendency for people to associate more
with others similar to themselves. This inequality can be mitigated by minority work-
ers having more social ties or a “stronger-knit” network. Hence, this paper uncovers a
direct mechanism for discriminatory outcomes that neither relies on past inequality nor
on discriminatory motives (i.e., neither of the prevailing economic models of taste-based
and statistical discrimination). These findings introduce multiple policy implications,
including disproving a primary justification for “colorblind policies—namely disproving
the position that such policies are inherently merit-enhancing.
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1 Introduction
U.S. history has seen Black workers suffer significant labor market disadvantages, receiv-
ing lower average income and levels of employment. The vestiges of slavery and state-enforced
racial segregation directly and indirectly have contributed to these disparities, confounding
efforts to foster equality.
Suppose, however, that demographic groups were equalized—that the slate were wiped
clean. In a world without prejudice—and one beginning in a state of equality—would labor
market disparities still arise between majority and minority workers? In this paper, I de-
velop an employment model and assume equal ability, employment, and network structure
between majority and minority workers in the initial time period. Despite these equalizing
assumptions, I find that if majority and minority workers share the same network density
and type in-group bias—in other words, if workers in both groups have an equal chance of
having a social tie and an equal bias in favor of forming same-group social ties—then the
probability of a firm offering a job through referral to minority workers is lower than their
share of the labor force. For minority workers to have a proportional chance of receiving
job offers through referral, they must compensate with a stronger network density and/or
type in-group bias. The estimated welfare gap increases nonlinearly with the majority group
share of the labor force, suggesting that the disadvantage of minority workers magnifies with
the degree of their minority status in the labor market. Finally, this paper calibrates the
model, determining under what conditions female doctors (who represent a minority of U.S.
physicians) achieve gender parity in referrals.
While the model works for arbitrary group assignments, social science research suggests
that race and ethnicity create the greatest divide socially, with age, religion, education,
occupation, and gender following in approximately that order (McPherson, Smith-Lovin,
and Cook 2001). Hence, this paper’s findings impact the debates surrounding policies that
explicitly support racial minorities and women. Many who debate such policies share a
common assumption: that in a world without historical discrimination—without misogyny
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or Jim Crow or implicit biases—“no policy” would be the best policy. No policy would yield
the most meritocratic outcome, with opportunities distributed according to corresponding
ability or “merit.”1 Yet the findings in this paper suggest otherwise. Achieving equality
of opportunity may remain elusive even in the absence of psychological prejudice, historical
wrongs, and differences in ability or education among the population.2 Advantages from
being within a larger or more strongly-connected social network may persist, despite one’s
talent. All else equal, outcomes may remain unequal.
This paper makes five contributions. First, the paper presents a novel theoretical ap-
proach for uncovering discriminatory outcomes independent from discriminatory motives
(i.e., independent from both prevailing models of discrimination in economics: taste-based
and statistical)—these discriminatory outcomes arise even under an initial state of equality.
In other words, not only does this paper develop a standard labor-market model that reveals
the limitations of past economic models of discrimination, but also this work offers a direct
rigorous account of “institutional discrimination” using mainstream economic theory.3 Sec-
ond, this paper performs equilibrium analysis of employment and wage differences caused by
homophily along majority/minority status, which is a contribution to both the economic and
sociological literatures on labor markets. Third, in doing so the paper isolates a potential
underlying mechanism for inequality, adding to our understanding of labor market disparities
that have been widely studied across the social sciences (e.g., ones relating to both race and
gender). The paper accomplishes this while making predictions on when disparities might
arise—as well as on when they might not. Fourth, this paper introduces a parameterization
of homophily that refines one that has been used in the social network theory literature; the
1. Various members of the Supreme Court have voiced this sentiment, along with some legal scholars,
particularly in the context of “colorblind” policies.
2. Notwithstanding little change in recent support for redistribution despite rises in inequality (Ashok,
Kuziemko, and Washington 2015), greater understanding of the fairness (or lack thereof) of the economic
system might influence some people’s preferences for redistribution (Alesina, Stantcheva, and Teso 2018).
3. Small and Pager (2020) defines “institutional discrimination” as differential treatment by race that is
either perpetrated by organizations or codified into law. This article also provides a lengthy discussion on
the divergence between economic and sociological approaches to discrimination, as well as propositions from
the sociology of racial discrimination “worth noting by economists.”
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refinement is especially useful when evaluating equal bias in favor of forming same-group
social ties between two groups of different sizes.4 Fifth, the paper calibrates the model using
2008-2012 data on U.S. physician referrals and determines under what conditions gender par-
ity would be achieved. In this calibration exercise, female physicians represent the minority
group and male physicians the majority group, based on relative levels of representation in
the industry. The type in-group bias required for female physicians to receive a proportional
amount of referrals is higher than both its initial value and the initial type in-group bias of
male physicians. In order to rectify the labor market disadvantage, 1.3 million (out of 7.8
million)—or 18%—of female-initiated referrals that initially went to male physicians would
instead need to go to female physicians.
Related Literature.— The model in this paper extends the one from Montgomery (1991)
to incorporate two-dimensional heterogeneity: while the original model only groups workers
by ability, this paper also groups them by majority/minority status. Doing so yields findings
that go far beyond a mere application of the base model. The original model does not focus
on outcomes when homophily (the well-documented tendency for people to associate more
with others similar to themselves) exists along characteristics uncorrelated with ability—
namely, on what effects emerge when social ties are formed along dimensions orthogonal to
productivity. The original model does not incorporate demographic considerations.
Filling this gap is important. Within sociology, research has explored homophily in var-
ious contexts, including its causes (Wimmer and Lewis 2010; Leszczensky and Pink 2019)
as well as how it influences friendships (Blau 1977; Syed and Juan 2012), interethnic mar-
riages (Skvoretz 2013), and social inequality (DiMaggio and Garip 2012), among other areas.
Within economics, there is an extant literature on the impact of referrals on inequality,5 yet
findings have relied on the existence of some degree of prior period inequality—namely, that
4. See Equation 1 in the Equilibrium Section (after reading the simplified numerical example that imme-
diately precedes it); also read the detailed exposition in the Discussion Section.
5. For some of the evidence, see Arrow and Borzekowski (2004), Ioannides and Datcher Loury (2004),
Bayer, Ross, and Topa (2008), Hellerstein, McInerney, and Neumark (2011), Renneboog and Zhao (2011),
Burks et al. (2015), and Pallais and Sands (2016).
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if a demographic group has higher past employment, then that would yield an advantage
in securing future jobs. This paper makes a new contribution combining insights from both
fields, demonstrating that referral advantages may still unequally accrue over time even un-
der initial equality, due to homophily. In particular, this paper adds a theoretical foundation
for why homophily may contribute to inequality in referral markets, as well as predicts under
what conditions such disparities will not surface.
There has been increasing focus on uncovering mechanisms behind racial disparities in
labor market outcomes (Bayer and Charles 2018; Chetty et al. 2020) as well as the persis-
tent gender-wage gap (Bertrand, Goldin, and Katz 2010; Blau and Kahn 2017). Evidence
for racial and gender differences in networking outcomes exists (Korenman and Turner 1996;
Lalanne and Seabright 2011; Mengel 2015; Lindenlaub and Prummer 2016). Zeltzer (2020)
presents empirical evidence to suggest that gender homophily is a significant factor in ex-
plaining the gender-wage gap among medical professionals. Jackson (2009) discusses how
homophily leads to segregation of groups, which leads to different equilibrium investment
decisions in areas like education. Yet this paper introduces a more direct mechanism for
inequality from homophily: that even given equal investments in human capital, homophily
may still directly foster disparities through hiring dynamics. Moreover, unlike in Calvo-
Armengol and Jackson (2004), which provides a network-based mechanism for perpetuating
pre-existing inequality, this paper uncovers inequality even without historical labor market
disadvantages. Though Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009) can be viewed as providing em-
pirical evidence to bolster some implications of our model, the study covers the formation
of friendships in a school context, which may not fully mirror the networking dynamics of
referrals.6 In addition, this paper’s findings are unlike those from sociology that link ho-
mophily to social inequality (see, e.g., DiMaggio and Garip 2012); in this paper, in contrast,
homophily’s impact on inequality does not operate through a mechanism that exacerbates
individual level differences (recall our model assumes groups have equal ability and initial
6. See, for example, the strong-tie vs. weak-tie distinction in Granovetter (1973) and Montgomery (1994).
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employment). Notably, this paper’s findings are also fully distinct from past economics and
sociology research on the influence of more traditional discrimination in hiring (see, e.g.,
Bertrand and Mullainathan 2004; Pager, Bonikowski, and Western 2009). Unlike those ar-
ticles, this one uncovers disparities even in contexts in which discriminatory motives and
implicit biases are not only absent but impossible, as the model in this paper does not allow
firms to distinguish who is a majority and who is a minority worker. Hence, the inequality
this paper uncovers may relate to—or exacerbate—broader disadvantages associated with
structural racism (see, e.g., Williams, Lawrence, and Davis 2019).
This paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces a formal setup of the model. Section
3 presents the model’s key findings for majority and minority workers. Section 4 provides
discussion. Section 5 performs a calibration of the model under simplifying assumptions.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Model
Here, I extend the Montgomery (1991) two-period model7 to incorporate two-dimensional
heterogeneity: while the original model only groups workers by ability, this one also groups
them by majority/minority status.8
Workers: I consider a labor market with two time periods (t = 1 and t = 2) and a
continuum of workers, with an equal measure in each period. Each worker works one period,
and is one of two types: majority or minority. Each worker’s type is predetermined and
assigned before the period in which he or she enters the market. The fraction of majority
workers is δ > 1
2
, while 1 − δ < 1
2
are minority. Similar to Montgomery (1991), I assume
that 1
2
of the workers within each type are high-ability, while 1
2
are low-ability. High-ability
workers produce one unit of output, while low-ability workers produce zero units. Work-
ers are observationally equivalent: firms neither know what ability workers possess (before
7. As with the original model, for simplicity there is no discounting between time periods.
8. Most of the model’s assumptions are standard in labor-market models of adverse selection, especially
that of Greenwald (1986) (Montgomery 1991).
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production), nor whether workers are of the majority or minority type (at any time).9
Firms: There is a continuum of firms in both time periods. Firms are free to enter the
market in either period. At most, each firm may employ one worker. A firm’s profit in each
period is equal to the productivity of its worker minus the wage paid.10 Each firm must
set wages before it learns the productivity of its worker. There are no output-contingent
contracts.11
Structure of Social Network: As the focus of the model is referrals, now I describe how
the social network through which referrals occur is drawn. As described, there are four
categories of workers: high-ability majority, high-ability minority, low-ability majority, and
low-ability minority. Now let us represent each period-2 worker as an urn, and each social tie
that a period-1 worker possesses as a ball.12 The assignment of social ties is equivalent to a
scenario where the balls are randomly dropped into the urns.13 A period-1 worker possesses
a social tie (“ball”) with a probability equal to its majority/minority type’s network density
(denoted by τmaj or τmin).
14 A period-1 worker’s sole social tie, if they have one, is dropped
into an “urn” (period-2 worker) which is: (1) of the same ability with probability α ∈ (1
2
, 1)15;
and (2) of the same majority/minority type with a probability determined by the period-1
worker’s in-group bias.16 The network structure is thus characterized by three parameters:
network density (τmaj and τmin), majority/minority type in-group bias (denoted by ψmaj and
9. Later we see that period-1 workers’ actions are nonstrategic; hence, no assumption needs to be made
on their knowledge of their own or of period-2 workers’ types.
10. Product price is exogenously determined and normalized to unity.
11. This assumption captures a significant rationale for screening of job applicants and the use of referrals:
the inability to fully tie compensation to productivity. See Montgomery (1991) and Greenwald (1986) for
further defense of this assumption.
12. The “urn-ball” model is standard in probability theory and has been used in various economics models.
For more background on the “urn-ball” model, see Shimer (2007).
13. Hence, period-2 workers can have zero, one or more than one social tie across period-1 workers.
14. If the period-1 worker is a majority worker, he or she possesses a social tie with probability τmaj ∈ (0, 1);
a minority worker possesses a social tie with probability τmin ∈ (0, 1).
15. The matched period-2 worker is hence of a different ability with probability 1− α ∈ (0, 12 ).
16. “In-group bias captures the bias workers exhibit toward other workers in favor of forming same-group so-
cial ties. Proposition 1 and the Discussion Section describe why the following specification is used: Pr{period-
1 worker knows own majority/minority type} = w·ψ[w·ψ]+[(1−w)(1−ψ)] , where w is the share of the labor force
for the worker type (either δ or 1 − δ) and ψ is the type in-group bias of the worker type (either ψmaj or
ψmin).
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ψmin, respectively), and ability in-group bias (α).
Timing: Each firm hires a period-1 worker through the market and learns his or her
ability. As period-1 workers are observationally equivalent (and cannot be referred for jobs
since there is no previous time period), each firm hiring through the market receives a high-
ability worker with probability 1
2
.
After learning the ability of its current worker, each firm may set a referral offer to be
relayed to the worker’s social tie. Whether the referral offer is relayed is conditional on the
firms worker holding a social tie. If he or she does hold one, then the firm will only attract
the acquaintance if the referral offer exceeds both the period-2 market wage and all other
referral offers received by the acquaintance. A firm not wishing to hire through referral
will set no referral offer (or might just set a referral offer below the period-2 market wage,
which has no probability of acceptance). Period-2 workers then compare all offers received,
accepting the highest.
All period-2 workers who receive no referral offers must find employment through the
general market.
In summary, the timing of the game is as follows.
1. Each firm hires period-1 workers through the market at a wage of wM1.
2. Period-1 production occurs, after which each firm learns the productivity of its worker.
3. Social ties are determined.
4. If a firm wishes to hire through referral, it sets a referral offer. I denote firm i’s referral
offer by wRi. (Conditional on having a social tie, each period-1 worker then relays his
or her firm’s wage offer (wRi) to their period-2 acquaintance.)
5. Each period-2 worker compares all wage offers received. They either accept one or wait
to find employment through the general market.
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6. Any period-2 worker with no offers (or who refuses all offers) goes on the market.
Wages in this market are denoted wM2.
7. Period-2 production occurs.
Figure 1: Model Parameters
Parameter Name Description Range
δ Majority share
Share of the total labor force
comprised of majority workers
δ ∈ (1
2
, 1)
1− δ Minority share Share of the total labor force
comprised of minority workers
1− δ ∈ (0, 1
2
)
α
Ability
in-group bias
Probability a worker’s social tie is
with another worker of equal ability
α ∈ (1
2
, 1)
τmaj
Network density
(majority group)
Probability a majority worker
has a social tie
τmaj ∈ (0, 1)
τmin
Network density
(minority group)
Probability a minority worker
has a social tie
τmin ∈ (0, 1)
ψmaj
Type
in-group bias
(majority group)
Bias a majority worker exhibits
toward workers of the same group
in favor of forming social ties. Value
of 1/2 means no bias (probability
of social tie with another majority
worker = δ). Value of 1 means
full bias (probability of social tie
with another majority worker = 1).*
I assume neither full nor no bias.
ψmaj ∈ (12 , 1)
ψmin
Type
in-group bias
(minority group)
Bias a minority worker exhibits
toward workers of the same group
in favor of forming social ties. Value
of 1/2 means no bias (probability
of social tie with another minority
worker = 1− δ). Value of 1 means
full bias (probability of social tie
with another minority worker = 1).*
I assume neither full nor no bias.
ψmin ∈ (12 , 1)
*ψ ∈ [0, 12 ) represents heterophily, a rare social network phenomenon outside the scope of this paper.
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3 Equilibrium
I examine a competitive equilibrium of the game in which firms seek to maximize profits.
The first subsection below presents basic equilibrium properties shared with Montgomery
(1991). The second subsection presents new propositions that I have added to the model
by incorporating two-dimensional heterogeneiy (i.e., categorization of workers by majority
and minority type in addition to (instead of solely by) ability level). These new propositions
relate to discrimination and labor market disparities.
3.1 Basic Equilibrium Properties
Basic equilibrium properties can be expressed via the following three lemmas, which
establish that (1) referral wage offers are dispersed within an interval between the period-2
market wage and a maximum referral wage offer; (2) a firm will only hire through referral
if it employs a high-ability worker in period-1; and (3) the period-1 market wage is greater
than the expected period-1 productivity. More discussion on each of these points is included
below. Omitted proofs are found in the Appendix.
Lemma 1 Referral wage offers lie within the interval between wM2 and a maximum referral
wage offer wR; hence, wR ∈ [wM2, wR]. The density of the referral wage offer distribution is
positive across this entire range.
Proof. Claim 4 in Burdett and Judd (1983) establishes the existence and uniqueness of
an equilibrium, while Theorem 4 proves wage dispersion exists in the equilibrium (since the
probability that a period-2 worker receives exactly one referral offer is strictly between 0 and
1). Given this wage dispersion, the market wage (wM2) must coincide with the bottom of
the referral wage distribution, as any referral offer below the market wage will necessarily be
rejected by workers in favor of going to the general market. At the maximum referral wage
offer (denoted wR and derived in Appendix Equation A.7), the probability a worker accepts
the referral offer is 1. Hence, firms will not offer a referral wage above this amount as it will
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necessarily reduce profits. Proposition 2.2 in Butters (1977) proves that there are no gaps in
the wage distribution. If there were a gap between some w1 and w2, then a firm offering the
higher wage could reduce its offer by  without reducing the probability its offer is accepted,
thereby increasing its profits.
Lemma 2 A firm will attempt to hire through referral if and only if it employs a high-ability
worker in period 1.
This result follows from the ability in-group bias (α). Hiring through the market yields zero
expected profit (due to the free entry of firms and the symmetric lack of information on
the ability of workers). For firms employing high-ability workers in period 1, an accepted
referral offer yields constant positive profit over the range of the referral offer distribution
[wM2, wR]. Higher wage offers yield a higher probability of attracting a period-2 worker.
Firms employing low-ability workers in period 1 will not hire through the referral market,
since the ability in-group bias means the referred worker will more likely also be low-ability.
As a result of this lemma, a disproportionately high number of low-ability workers find
employment through the general market. This drives the market wage below the average
productivity of the entire population. However, adverse selection does not eliminate the
market. Since some high-ability workers are not “well-connected,” they fail to receive referral
wage offers, which leads them to find employment in the general market. Thus, the market
wage remains above zero.
Lemma 3 The period-1 market wage is greater than the expected period-1 productivity.
If a firm obtains a high-ability worker in period-1, they expect positive period-2 profits.
This fact drives the period-1 market wage higher than the productivity of the population.
This wage can be viewed as comprising the average productivity of the worker plus an
“option value” of a period-2 referral. This option will be exercised if the period-1 worker
reveals themselves to be high-ability (which occurs after period-1 production concludes, if
the worker is in fact high-ability).
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3.2 Propositions on Discrimination
New propositions reflecting discrimination and inequality are detailed below. The propo-
sitions establish that minority workers receive a disproportionately low fraction of job offers
through referral and a lower expected referral wage, all else equal. Recall that the market
wage lies below the referral offer distribution. Hence, all these effects taken together yield a
welfare gap between minority and majority workers in period-2 that did not exist in period-1.
Omitted proofs are included in the Appendix.
Proposition 1A In an environment with equal magnitude of majority/minority network
parameters (τmaj = τmin and ψmaj = ψmin), the probability a high-ability minority worker
in period-2 receives a referral offer is lower than their share of the labor force. The inverse
holds for majority workers:
Pr{period-2 high-ability minority worker receives referral offer} < 1− δ
2
Pr{period-2 high-ability majority worker receives referral offer} > δ
2
Proposition 1B The inequality in the distribution of referral job offers can be eliminated
by minority workers having a sufficiently higher type in-group bias (ψmin).
First I explore the intuition of Proposition 1A by using a simple numerical example that
illustrates type in-group bias.17 Suppose there are two majority workers in both periods,
and one minority worker in both periods—i.e., δ = 2/3. Also suppose there is type in-
group bias: each worker has a bias in favor of forming social ties with workers of the same
majority/minority type. To illustrate this bias, let us say that for each interaction between
majority period-1 and majority period-2 workers, there is a 2/3 chance of forming a tie,
whereas an interaction between a majority period-1 and minority period-2 worker has a 1/3
17. This example is illustrative and departs from the model insofar as it depicts the effects from type in-
group bias in isolation. As such, the example does not explicitly incorporate worker ability (one can assume
all workers are high-ability). Furthermore, the example includes a finite number of workers whereas the
model includes a continuum.
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chance of forming a tie—i.e., ψ = 2/3. Suppose all three period-1 workers interact with all
three period-2 workers. The expected number of ties period-1 majority workers form with
their own type is thus 4/3 (while the expected number of ties with minority workers is 1/3);
this means the fraction of same-type social ties for majority workers is 4/5. Let φmaj = 0.8
denote this fraction of same-type social ties (note that φ is not a parameter of the model and
can be parameterized directly from ψ via Equation 1 below). Similarly, it is straightforward
to calculate that the fraction of same-type social ties for the period-1 minority worker is
φmin = 0.5.
Now let us apply these bias dynamics to a referral context in which period-1 workers each
have at most one social tie, and the likelihood of having that tie is 100% (τmaj = τmin = 1).
The fraction of referral job offers going to majority workers is simply a weighted sum:
Pr{referral job offer goes to majority period-2 worker}
= Pr{period-1 worker is majority} · Pr{period-1 majority knows period-2 majority}
+ Pr{period-1 worker is minority} · Pr{period-1 minority knows period-2 majority}
= δ · τmaj · φmaj + (1− δ) · τmin · (1− φmin)
= 2/3 · 1 · 0.8 + 1/3 · 1 · 0.5
= 0.7
Hence, only 0.3 of referral job offers go to minority workers, even though they occupy 1/3
of the labor force. This simple example illustrates the distorting influence of having the same
magnitude of bias operating on groups of different sizes. The bias in favor of a same-group
social tie for a majority worker extends toward a greater fraction of the population than
does the same magnitude of bias for a minority worker. Hence, equal magnitudes of bias
unequally impact the respective chances of knowing workers of the same type.
Now I return to the model. I can generalize both the reasoning of the simple example
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above and the type-in group bias of the model as follows:
Pr{period-1 worker knows own maj/min type} = φ = w · ψ
[w · ψ] + [(1− w)(1− ψ)](1)
where w is the share of the labor force for the worker type (either δ or 1 − δ) and ψ is the
in-group bias of the worker type (either ψmaj or ψmin). ψ = 0.5 reflects no bias—i.e., a
proportional chance of a social tie being with another of the same type—and ψ = 1 reflects
when all ties are with members of the same type. φ represents either φmaj or φmin, depending
on whether the period-1 worker belongs to the majority or minority group, respectively. The
Discussion section further explores the relationship between ψ and φ, and its implications
on the results.
In the Appendix, I prove that parity in the distribution of job offers between high-ability
majority and minority workers is accomplished only when:
(1− δ) [δτmajφmaj + (1− δ)τmin(1− φmin)] = δ [δτmaj(1− φmaj) + (1− δ)τmin(φmin)](2)
where φmaj and φmin are calculated from Equation 1 above. From Equation 2, one can
calculate what magnitude other parameters must be for parity. I denote such parameters for
minority workers as τ=min (compensating network density) and ψ
=
min (compensating in-group
bias). Figure 2 illustrates that a sufficiently high network density or type in-group bias can
mitigate the disproportionality in the distribution of job offers through referral. All else
equal, minority workers can either have more social ties (τ=min > τmaj) or a “stronger-knit”
social network (ψ=min > ψmaj).
The network density required to eliminate the inequality (τ=min) increases in τmaj, ψmaj,
and δ. It decreases in ψmin, which can readily be understood intuitively. The greater the
probability of majority workers having social ties (and/or the greater the degree of their
homophily), the greater minority workers’ compensating parameters (τ=min or ψ
=
min) must be
to achieve a proportional amount of all job offers through referrals. In Figure 2, the plot
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Figure 2: Magnitude of Minority Group Network Parameters
Required for Parity in Referral Job Offers*
*In each chart, all other relevant network parameters = 0.8.
of τ=min has no values when δ is greater than approximately 0.63. This is because there is
no attainable magnitude of network density that will yield parity in the distribution of job
offers when δ surpasses this threshold.
Proposition 2 In an environment with equal magnitude of majority/minority network pa-
rameters (τmaj = τmin and ψmaj = ψmin), the period-2 market wage (wM2) decreases as
majority workers occupy a greater fraction of the labor force.
Recall that workers who do not receive jobs through referral must find employment
through the market. Proposition 1 shows that minority workers, all else equal, receive a
disproportionately low fraction of job offers through referral, and thus disproportionately
find employment through the market. Decreases in the market wage (wM2) thereby hurt the
average welfare of minority workers, relative to that of majority workers.
The Appendix includes the expression for wM2. Given α >
1
2
, wM2 is always less than
1
2
,
the average productivity of the population. Analysis shows that wM2 is decreasing in α. For
all ψmaj = ψmin and τmaj = τmin, wM2 also decreases in δ.
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Proposition 3 In an environment with equal magnitude of majority/minority network pa-
rameters (τmaj = τmin and ψmaj = ψmin), the welfare (i.e., average expected wage) for
minority workers is lower than for majority workers.
Much of the intuition behind this finding follows from Proposition 1 (that majority
workers receive a disproportionately high number of job offers through referral). There are
two margins to consider. First, the extensive margin: majority workers disproportionately
get hired through the referral market (which provides higher wages than the general market),
driving up expected welfare for the majority group. Second, the intensive margin: recall
that workers accept the maximum referral wage offer received. Hence, by majority workers
receiving a higher number of referral offers, their expected maximum offer increases, thereby
also driving up their relative welfare.
Let E
∏
H(wR) denote the expected period-2 profit earned by a firm employing a high-
ability worker and setting a referral wage. To maintain equilibrium wage dispersion, firms
must earn the same expected profit on each referral wage offered:
E
∏
H
(wR) = c ∀wR ∈ [wM2, wR]
Given the expression for c derived in the Appendix, firms with high-ability workers who
have social ties earn positive expected profits as long as α > 1
2
. Analysis shows that c is
increasing in τmaj and τmin. Furthermore, the equilibrium referral-offer distribution F (•)
may be determined by setting E
∏
H(wR) equal to c for all potential wage offers wR.
Unfortunately, doing so does not yield a closed-form solution for F (wR). Given a con-
tinuum of firms, the equilibrium referral-offer distribution F (•) can be interpreted as either:
1) each firm randomizes over the entire distribution; or 2) a fraction f(wR) of firms offers
each wage for sure. From the second interpretation, I denote these referral wages with wRk.
One can then derive an expression for wRk(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin, F (wRk)) and calculate
an average referral wage received by a majority worker (denoted E(wRHmaj)) vs. a minority
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worker (denoted E(wRHmin)), for any given δ, α, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, and ψmin.
Analysis shows that when majority/minority network parameters are the same magni-
tude, if α > 1
2
and δ > 1
2
, E(wRHmaj) > E(wRHmin). In other words, the expected referral
wage for high-ability majority workers is greater than for high-ability minority workers.
Welfare (i.e., expected wage) is calculated by summing the market wage (wM2) and
expected referral wage (E(wRHmaj) or E(wRHmin)), weighted by the likelihood of the worker’s
type gaining employment through the market or through referrals, respectively. Figure
3 plots the estimated welfare gap between majority and minority workers as a function
of various network parameters.18 The welfare gap increases in δ, α, ψmaj, and τmaj. It
decreases in ψmin and τmin. Of note, the welfare gap increases nonlinearly as the majority
group occupies a greater share of the labor force.
4 Discussion
In this model, one might consider alternative specifications to parameterize the type
in-group bias, and its relationship to the probability of having a same-group social tie.
Coleman (1958) uses a specification that implies that the relationship between Pr{Period-1
worker knows own majority/minority type} and in-group bias would be linear.19 The only
justification the paper mentions for this parameterization of inbreeding is that it leads to
a measure that varies between zero and one (pg. 34). Yet this linear scaling is plausibly
less appropriate for modeling the bias individual workers exhibit across a population. To
understand why, consider an individual worker from each group. For the majority worker,
any given magnitude of bias in favor of same-group social ties operates on a greater share
of the population than it does for a minority worker. Hence, one would expect the bias
to have some multiplicative relationship with the share of the labor force, which the linear
18. Estimation of wage gap normalizes to 1 the number of offers that referred high-ability minority workers
receive and assumes a uniform distribution across the referral wage distribution (wR ∼ U(wM2, wR))
19. Coleman’s specification would be Pr(Period-1 worker knows own type) = (1−w) ·ψ+w, with ψ ∈ [0, 1].
One recent paper that uses this specification is Currarini, Jackson, and Pin (2009).
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Figure 3: Estimated Welfare Gap of Minority Workers*
*In each chart, the parameters not being varied all equal 0.8.
scaling does not have. Furthermore, one would expect any given magnitude of bias to have
an amplified effect on the likelihood of having a same-group social tie for a given majority
worker compared to a given minority worker. A linear scaling does not account for the fact
that the same magnitude of bias would plausibly have a disproportionately larger impact on
the incidence of same-group social ties for the larger social group. The specification I use in
this paper corrects for these shortcomings.
Figure 4 illustrates the sensitivity of same-group social ties (φ) to the in-group bias
parameter (ψ), based on the expression linking share of the labor force (w) to in-group bias
described in Equation 1 of Proposition 1:
Pr{period-1 worker knows own maj/min type} = φ = w · ψ
[w · ψ] + [(1− w)(1− ψ)]
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(The simplified numerical example immediately following Proposition 1 in the Equilibrium
Section illustrates the logic of this expression.) When ψ = 0.5, there is no bias (i.e., proba-
bility of social ties with the same type = w); when ψ = 1, there is full bias (i.e., probability
of social ties with the same type = 1). The dashed line represents a linear scaling, in which
there is no amplification/dampening effect for majority and minority workers. Though not
included in the graph below, the specification used in this article yields a linear relationship
if both workers’ groups occupy 50% of the labor force (i.e., when social groups are the same
size there is no amplification/dampening effect).
Figure 4: Social Tie Sensitivity to In-Group Bias*
*where majority share of the labor force is 80%
The main findings in this paper are robust to specifications for bias—e.g., Equation 1
from Proposition 1—where the relationship between the probability of knowing ones own
type (φ) and the bias (ψ) is more concave for majority workers than for minority workers.
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In other words, it is robust to specifications where there is a comparative amplification effect
on the incidence of same-group social ties for majority workers (as seen in Figure 4). This
relationship captures the fact that an equal magnitude of bias has a disproportionately larger
impact on majority workers than on minority workers.
Recall that the predicted inequality between majority and minority workers is based on
several assumptions, which include: (1) majority and minority workers have no labor market
disparities in the initial time period; (2) the only distinguishable difference between groups is
relative size (i.e., ability, network density, and in-group biases are all equivalent); (3) workers
are more likely to know others with similar characteristics; and (4) there is no psychological
prejudice. These assumptions are critical when considering historical examples where minor-
ity workers enjoy greater welfare than majority workers (e.g., white South Africans), or when
particular demographic groups who comprise a majority of a local labor market face worse
outcomes (e.g., Black workers in a variety of U.S. metropolitan areas). These cases do not
undermine the accuracy of the model, not only because their circumstances clearly violate
the model’s assumptions (e.g., that there is full equality between groups in the initial time
period), but also because these cases intimately involve the distorting influence or legacy of
psychological prejudice, which the employment model explicitly and intentionally does not
incorporate.
5 Calibration
The model can be calibrated to real-world contexts under simplifying assumptions. I
do so here using referral data from U.S. physicians. Male physicians represent the majority
group (81% of referring physicians), while female physicians represent the minority group.
The data source is the Carrier database, which consists of panel data on all physician-
billed services for a random sample of 20 percent of Medicare beneficiaries between 2008-2012.
The data are managed by the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services (CMS) and encode
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the identities of the patients, physicians, and specialists. The sample contains information on
patients with traditional fee-for-service Medicare (which comprises two-thirds of all Medicare
beneficiaries) and represents a total of 35 million covered people and more than half a million
physicians across the United States.
One simplifying assumption I use is that the referral behavior does not come from un-
derlying unobserved ability differences. While this assumption may seem extreme, there is
evidence that at least some element of the referral behavior of physicians is dependent on
gender, independent of ability (Sarsons 2017; Zeltzer 2020). Furthermore, recall that our
model assumes one social tie per period-1 worker; actual physicians undoubtedly have more.
To account for this, I assume the sole social tie from the model simply corresponds with
the strongest link (i.e., the physician who is actually referred). Other simplifying assump-
tions include: (1) that each referral corresponds to a distinct period-1 worker; (2) that each
physician represents a high-ability worker; and (3) that the patient decision in selecting a
physician is akin to the firm decision in hiring workers (in both cases, the referral presum-
ably reduces uncertainty about the ability of the physician/worker being hired). Lastly, in
actual U.S. Medicare referrals there is no wage dispersion: cost of care is set exogenously
by Medicare policy and is equivalent across all referrals. Hence, this calibration primarily
focuses on the chance of getting a job through referral (i.e., Proposition 1).
To Female Physician
(Period-2 minority)
To Male Physician
(Period-2 majority)
Total
From Female Physician
(Period-1 minority)
1.73 7.78 9.51
From Male Physician
(Period-1 majority)
5.65 35.03 40.68
Total 7.38 42.81 50.19
Table 1: U.S. Physician Referrals (Millions), 2008-2012
I now determine the following unknown parameters: δ, 1 − δ, τmaj, and τmin. Table 1
shows the breakdown of physician referrals by gender. Using these values, I can calculate that
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δ = 0.81 (total male-initiated referrals divided by total referrals).20 Similarly, 1− δ = 0.19.
Finally, I benchmark male physician network density (τmaj = 0.108) and female physician
network density (τmin = 0.185) to a previous study.
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The remaining unknown parameters I will calibrate are the type in-group biases ψmaj and
ψmin.
22 I will be calculating the type in-group bias values using Equation 1 from Proposition
1. Adapting that equation to this particular context gives us the following two Expressions:
Pr{period-1 male refers male} = φmaj = δ · ψmaj
[δ · ψmaj] + [(1− δ)(1− ψmaj)](1)
Pr{period-1 female refers female} = φmin = (1− δ) · ψmin
[(1− δ) · ψmin] + [δ · (1− ψmin)](2)
First, from Table 1 I can calculate in a straightforward manner Pr(period-1 male physician
refers male physician) = φmaj = 0.86. Similarly, Pr(period-1 female physician refers female
physician) = φmin = 0.18. Now using Expression 1, I can calculate the magnitude of the
type in-group bias for male physicians, which is ψmaj = 0.59. Using Expression 2, I can do
the same for female physicians, which is ψmin = 0.50. Notice that ψmin equals 0.5, which
means under our simplifying assumptions female physicians do not demonstrate any bias in
their referral behavior in favor of same-group social ties.
Now that I have calculated all relevant unknown parameters to our model, I can determine
how much minority network parameters would need to shift in order to achieve gender parity.
To do so, I will use Expression 3 below (which mirrors Equation 2 from Proposition 1).
Expression 3 demonstrates the condition under which parity in the distribution of job offers
between high-ability majority workers (male physicians) and high-ability minority workers
20. This approximation for δ yields more conservative estimates of gender disparities than using estimates
of the overall share of male physicians in the U.S. (δ = 0.67 in 2012 according to https://stats.oecd.org)
21. These values represent the general definition of network density from the literature (i.e., the proportion
of possible ties that are actualized among the members of a network). As no U.S. estimates were found, I
benchmark network density values for male and female physicians to ones estimated from a healthcare study
in another industrialized nation (Aguirre-Duarte, Carswell, and Kenealy 2020).
22. By construction in our model, the ability in-group bias, α, is symmetric between majority and minority
workers, so key findings do not depend on its value.
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(female physicians) is achieved. This outcome occurs only when:
(1− δ) [δτmajφmaj + (1− δ)τmin(1− φmin)] = δ [δτmaj(1− φmaj) + (1− δ)τmin(φmin)](3)
First, let us try to calculate the compensating minority network density (τ=min), which is
the minority network density that would achieve gender parity in the distribution of referral
job offers. Using Expression 3, I discover that no value of τmin ∈ [0, 1] can achieve such
parity. This result is in line with the prediction from Figure 2 of the Results section (i.e.,
that under certain social network conditions δ can be too large for parity to be achievable
by simply increasing minority network density alone). In short, this exercise suggests the
parameters of this physician social network are too imbalanced for female physicians to
achieve gender parity simply by increasing their likelihood of having social ties compared
with male physicians.
Next, let us calculate the compensating minority type in-group bias (ψ=min), which is the
minority type in-group bias that would achieve gender parity in the distribution of referral
job offers. Again I use Expression 3, this time first solving for φmin (holding other parameters
fixed at their calibrated values). Then, I use Expression 2 on this calculated value of φmin
to determine ψ=min. By doing so, one finds that ψ
=
min = 0.66. Not only is this value higher
than the female baseline bias of 0.50, but also it is higher than the calibrated bias of male
physicians (at 0.59). This supports Proposition 1B, which asserts that minority workers must
have a sufficiently higher type in-group bias to reduce labor market disparities sprouting from
homophily along majority/minority status. In this case, despite female physicians having a
higher network density, they still need to be better connected to achieve gender parity. All
else equal, minority workers must be more “strongly-knit.” It is straightforward to calculate
that at this magnitude of the compensating in-group bias (when ψ=min = 0.66), 1.27 million
of the 2008-2012 referrals that went to male physicians would need to have instead gone to
female physicians.
22
If the 1.27 million change in referral behavior were shouldered solely by women, the
female-to-female referrals would be larger by 73.3% and the female-to-male referrals would
be lower by 16.3%. Instead, if this change in the incidence of referrals were shouldered solely
by men, the male-to-female referrals would be larger by 22.4% and the male-to-male referrals
would be lower by 3.6%. Under this final scenario where men alter their referral behavior,
the in-group bias of male physicians would be lower: ψmaj would now be 0.50 (as opposed
to the initial value of 0.59)—this means male physicians would no longer be demonstrating
any same-group bias in their referral behavior.
6 Conclusion
Exploring the model’s predictions in additional real-world contexts may further enhance
our understanding of the mechanisms underlying racial and gender labor market disparities,
while serving to better inform solutions. I leave this for future research.
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Appendix
Lemma 2 A firm will attempt to hire through referral if and only if it employs a high-ability
worker in period 1.
Proof. Firms employing high-ability workers in period 1 will make referral offers for two
reasons. First, hiring through the market yields zero expected profit (given the assump-
tion of free entry of firms). Second, an accepted referral offer yields constant positive profit
over the range of the referral offer wage distribution [wM2, wR]. (If it did not yield con-
stant positive profits, it would be impossible to maintain equilibrium wage dispersion; the
profit-maximizing firms would offer only a subset of the distribution—i.e., those wages that
maximized profits.) An offer below wM2 will never be accepted, while an offer above wR
increases the wage without increasing the probability of attracting a worker. To complete
the proof of this lemma, I show that firms employing low-ability workers in period 1 will hire
through the market (i.e., not rely on referrals).
If a firm employing a low-ability worker did deviate from this Lemma and made a re-
ferral offer wR, its expected profit (denoted E
∏
L(wR)) would be represented by a slight
modification to the expression for the expected profit for a firm employing a high-ability
worker (denoted E
∏
H(wR) and derived in Equation A.6 of Proposition 3). The expression
for E
∏
L(wR) differs from that of E
∏
H(wR) in that the incidences of α in the first p
HMAJ ,
pHMIN , pLMAJ , and pLMIN terms are replaced with (1− α), and vice versa.
In this scenario, as long as α > 1
2
, E
∏
L(wR) < 0. Hence, expected profits are less
than those from hiring in the general market, which equals zero due to free entry of firms.
The lemma is thus proved: a firm employing a low-ability worker in period-1 prefers to hire
through the market, maximizing expected profit.
Lemma 3 The period-1 market wage is greater than the expected period-1 productivity.
Proof. Firms hiring in the period-1 market earn an expected period-2 profit equal to the
probability of obtaining a high-ability period-1 worker times the expected profit (denoted c)
from a referral. Free entry thus drives the wage above expected period-1 productivity:
wM1(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin)
=
1
2
+
1
2
c(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin)
=
1
2
[1 + c(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin)]
The expression for c is derived in Proposition 3. Given comparative-statics results on c, wM1
is increasing in τmaj and τmin. When both τmaj = τmin and ψmaj = ψmin, wM1 is decreasing
in δ.
Proposition 1A In an environment with equal magnitude of majority/minority network
parameters (τmaj = τmin and ψmaj = ψmin), the probability a high-ability minority worker
in period-2 receives a referral offer is lower than their share of the labor force. The inverse
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holds for majority workers:
Pr{period-2 high-ability minority worker receives referral offer} < 1− δ
2
Pr{period-2 high-ability majority worker receives referral offer} > δ
2
Proposition 1B The inequality in the distribution of referral job offers can be eliminated
by minority workers having a sufficiently higher type in-group bias (ψmin).
Proof. Let us first consider a given high-ability period-2 worker (H). Since all referral wage
offers are above the period-2 market wage, the probability that H would accept a referral
wage offer wRi from firm i can be expressed:
Pr{H accepts wRi} = Pr{H receives no higher offer wRj ∀ firm j 6= i}
Since referral offers are allocated independently,
Pr{H accepts wRi} =
∏
j 6=i
Pr{H receives no higher offer wRj}
=
∏
j 6=i
[ 1− Pr{H receives an offer wRj > wRi}]
The probability that firm j offers a wage wRj > wRi to H is the product of two independent
probabilities:
Pr{H receives an offer wRj > wRi} = Pr{firm j makes offer to H} · Pr{wRj > wRi}
If 2N workers were in period-1, free entry implies that N firms employ high-ability workers.
Now I will analyze both parts of the expression from the perspective of a high-ability majority
worker (Hmaj) and high-ability minority worker (Hmin).
The probability that firm j offers a referral to Hmaj is a weighted average of whether firm
j hired a majority or minority worker in period-1. Denote φmaj as the probability a majority
worker knows another majority worker, and φmin as the probability a minority worker knows
another minority worker, where:
φmaj =
(δ · ψmaj)
(δ · ψmaj) + [(1− δ) · (1− ψmaj)] , and
φmin =
(1− δ) · ψmin
[(1− δ) · ψmin] + [δ · (1− ψmin)]
Then:
Pr{firm j makes offer to Hmaj} = δ
(
ατmajφmaj
N
)
+ (1− δ)
(
ατmin(1− φmin)
N
)
(A.1)
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Likewise, for a period-2 minority high-ability worker:
Pr{firm j makes offer to Hmin} = δ
(
ατmaj(1− φmaj)
N
)
+ (1− δ)
(
ατminφmin
N
)
Based on these expressions, for minority workers to have a proportional chance of receiving
job offers through referral, the following must hold:
Pr{firms make offer to Hmaj} ∝ Pr{firms make offer to Hmin}
only when
(1− δ) [δτmajφmaj + (1− δ)τmin(1− φmin)] = δ [δτmaj(1− φmaj) + (1− δ)τmin(φmin)]
Both the minority network density required to compensate for the inequality (denoted
τ=min) and the minority type in-group bias required to compensate (denoted ψ
=
min) increase
in τmaj, ψmaj, and δ. The greater the probability of majority workers having social ties (or
the greater the degree of their type in-group bias or likelihood of possessing social ties),
the greater minority workers’ compensating parameters (τ=min or ψ
=
min) must be to achieve a
proportional amount of all job offers through referrals.
Though higher minority network density and type in-group bias can both reduce the dis-
proportionality in the distribution of job offers through referral, analysis shows that between
these two parameters only ψ=min is attainable (i.e., below 1) under all possible combinations
of social network parameters.
Proposition 2 In an environment with equal magnitude of majority/minority network pa-
rameters (τmaj = τmin and ψmaj = ψmin), the period-2 market wage (wM2) decreases as
majority workers occupy a greater fraction of the labor force.
Proof. First I derive an expression for period-2 market wage. I build on the analysis
from Proposition 1. If there were 2N workers in period-1, free entry implies that N firms
employ high-ability workers. If firms select their referral wage offer by randomizing over the
equilibrium wage distribution F (•) (to be derived below),
Pr{Hmaj receives an offer wRj > wRi} = Pr{firm j makes offer to Hmaj} · [1− F (wRi)]
for all firms j who employ a high-ability worker in period-1. I have already shown that:
Pr{H accepts wRi} =
∏
j 6=i
Pr{H receives no higher offer wRj}
=
∏
j 6=i
[ 1− Pr{H receives an offer wRj > wRi}]
29
Substitution yields:
Pr{Hmaj accepts wRi}
= {1− [ 1
N
(δατmajφmaj + (1− δ)ατmin(1− φmin))] · [1− F (wRi)]}N−1
Since the model assumes a large number of workers, as N approaches ∞,
Pr{Hmaj accepts wRi} = exp{−[δατmajφmaj + (1− δ)ατmin(1− φmin)][1− F (wRi)]}(A.2)
Details on this step can be found in Rapoport (1963) and Montgomery (1991). One can
use similar steps to obtain the probability that firm i’s offer is accepted by a given high-
ability majority worker (Hmaj), low-ability majority worker(Lmaj), and low-ability minority
worker(Lmin).
As high-ability workers tend to receive more offers, they are less likely to accept any
given offer wRi < wR. Since a period-2 worker finds employment through the market only if
he receives no offers (or rejects all referral offers):
Pr{market | Hmaj} = Pr{Hmaj accept wM2}
The market wage coincides with the bottom of the referral wage distribution, F (•), be-
cause any referral wage below the market wage will be rejected by period-2 workers, to gain
employment through the market. Thus, given that F (wM2) = 0:
Pr{market | Hmaj} = exp{−[δατmajφmaj + (1− δ)ατmin(1− φmin)]}
I can derive similar expressions for Hmin, Lmaj, and Lmin. Let:
eHMAJ = exp{−[δατmajφmaj + (1− δ)ατmin(1− φmin)]}
eHMIN = exp{−[δατmaj(1− φmaj) + (1− δ)ατminφmin]}
eLMAJ = exp{−[δ(1− α)τmajφmaj + (1− δ)(1− α)τmin(1− φmin)]}
eLMIN = exp{−[δ(1− α)τmaj(1− φmaj) + (1− δ)(1− α)τminφmin]}
(A.3)
I now use Bayes’s rule to calculate the period-2 market wage:
wM2(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin)
= E(productivity | market)
=
Pr(market | Hmaj) · Pr(Hmaj) + Pr(market | Hmin) · Pr(Hmin)
Pr(market | H) · Pr(H) + Pr(market | L) · Pr(L)
=
(eHMAJ · δ) + (eHMIN · (1− δ))
(eHMAJ + eLMAJ) · δ + (eHMIN + eLMIN) · (1− δ)
(A.4)
Given α > 1
2
and both network densities (τmaj and τmin) greater than zero, wM2 is always less
than 1
2
, the average productivity of the population. Analysis shows that wM2 is decreasing
in α. Furthermore, for all ψmaj = ψmin and τmaj = τmin, wM2 is also decreasing in δ.
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Proposition 3 In an environment with equal magnitude of majority/minority network pa-
rameters (τmaj = τmin and ψmaj = ψmin), the welfare (i.e., average expected wage) for
minority workers is lower than for majority workers.
Proof. Consider the expected period-2 profit earned by a firm employing a high-ability
worker and setting a referral wage (recall the productivity of high-ability workers equals one,
while that of low-ability workers equals zero):
E
∏
H(wR)
= Pr{high-ability majority period-2 referral hired | wR} · (1− wR)
+ Pr{high-ability minority period-2 referral hired | wR} · (1− wR)
+ Pr{low-ability majority period-2 referral hired | wR} · (−wR)
+ Pr{low-ability minority period-2 referral hired | wR} · (−wR)
(If no referred worker is hired, perhaps because the period-1 worker possesses no social tie or
because the referred acquaintance receives a better offer, the firm hires through the market
and earns zero expected profit.)
The probability of hiring a high-ability majority period-2 referred worker is the product
of two independent probabilities (substituting from Equations A.1 and A.2 from Propositions
1 and 2):
Pr{high-ability period-2 majority referral hired | wR}
= Pr{offer made to a high-ability majority referral} · Pr{Hmaj accepts wR}
= δατmajφmaj + (1− δ)ατmin(1− φmin)
· exp{−[δατmajφmaj + (1− δ)ατmin(1− φmin)][1− F (wR)]}
Similar steps can be followed to derive the respective conditional probability for high-ability
minority, low-ability majority, and low-ability minority workers.
Let:
pHMAJ = δατmajφmaj + (1− δ)ατmin(1− φmin)
pHMIN = δατmaj(1− φmaj) + (1− δ)ατminφmin
pLMAJ = δ(1− α)τmajφmaj + (1− δ)(1− α)τmin(1− φmin)
pLMIN = δ(1− α)τmaj(1− φmaj) + (1− δ)(1− α)τminφmin
(A.5)
So, to simplify:
E
∏
H(wR)
= pHMAJ · exp{−[pHMAJ ][1− F (wRi)]} · (1− wR)
+ pHMIN · exp{−[pHMIN ][1− F (wRi)]} · (1− wR)
+ pLMAJ · exp{−[pLMAJ ][1− F (wRi)]} · (−wR)
+ pLMIN · exp{−[pLMIN ][1− F (wRi)]} · (−wR)
(A.6)
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To maintain equilibrium wage dispersion, firms must earn the same expected profit on each
referral wage offered:
E
∏
H
(wR) = c ∀wR ∈ [wM2, wR]
To calculate this profit constant, note that the firm could deviate from the specified strategy
and offer a wage of wM2; in this case, the referred worker accepts the firm’s offer only if they
receive no other offers.
Recall that F (wM2) = 0. The firm’s expected profit is therefore given by (using terms
defined in Equations A.3 and A.5):
E
∏
H
(wM2)
= (pHMAJ)(eHMAJ)(1− wM2) + (pHMIN)(eHMIN)(1− wM2)
+ (pLMAJ)(eLMAJ)(−wM2) + (pLMIN)(eLMIN)(−wM2)
= c
Substituting for wM2 (Equation A.4), I can determine c(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin). Given
α > 1
2
, firms with high-ability workers who possess social ties earn positive expected profits.
Analysis shows that c is increasing in α, τmaj, and τmin. When both ψmaj = ψmin and
τmaj = τmin, c is decreasing in δ.
Given the expression for c(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin), the equilibrium referral-offer dis-
tribution F (•) can be determined by setting E∏H(wR) (Equation A.6) equal to c for all
potential wage offers wR.
Unfortunately, doing so does not yield a closed-form solution for F (wR). Given a con-
tinuum of firms, the equilibrium referral-offer distribution F (•) can be interpreted as either:
(1) each firm randomizes over the entire distribution; or (2) a fraction f(wR) of firms offers
each wage for sure.
From the second interpretation, one can denote these referral wages with wRk and
estimate the average referral wage received by a high-ability majority worker (denoted
E(wRHmaj)) vs. a high-ability minority worker (denoted E(wRHmin)), for any given δ, α,
τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, and ψmin. Analysis shows that in an environment with equal magnitude of
majority/minority network parameters, if α > 1
2
and δ > 1
2
, E(wRHmaj) > E(wRHmin).
Proposition 1 shows that, all else equal, minority workers receive a smaller proportion
of jobs through referral than their fraction of the population. As a result, minority workers
more frequently gain employment through the market, receiving the (lower) market wage.
In this Proposition, I showed that even when offered a job through referral, minority workers
have lower expected referral wages than majority workers.
To conclude, one can derive an expression for the maximum referral wage offered wR
(where F (wR) = 1, by definition):
wR(α, δ, τmaj, τmin, ψmaj, ψmin) =
pHMAJ + pHMIN − c
pHMAJ + pHMIN + pLMAJ + pLMIN
(A.7)
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A firm that offers a referral wage of wR attracts a referred worker with probability 1 (con-
ditional on its period-1 worker possessing a social tie). The firm’s expected profit, c, is thus
equal to pHMAJ + pHMIN − wR(pHMAJ + pHMIN + pLMAJ + pLMIN). wR is increasing in α,
τmaj, and τmin.
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